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@@ -249,3 +249,149 @@ def test_cross_tenant_list_does_not_include_other_tenant(client, db, tenant_and_
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assert not leaked, (
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f"Tenant A's list leaked tenant B's agent! Got: {leaked}"
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)
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+
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+
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+# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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+# audit #26 — /analyze/* router auth + body size cap
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+# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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+
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+def test_analyze_lint_requires_auth(client):
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+ """audit #26: was `(req: AnalyzeRequest)` — no Depends(get_tenant).
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+ Free-compute / DoS amplifier. Now must 401 without a Bearer."""
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+ r = client.post("/api/v1/analyze/lint", json={"config": "type: react"})
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+ assert r.status_code == 401, (
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+ f"/analyze/lint accepted unauthenticated request! got {r.status_code}"
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+ )
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+
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+
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+def test_analyze_lint_accepts_valid_key(client, tenant_and_key):
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+ _, key = tenant_and_key
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+ r = client.post("/api/v1/analyze/lint",
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+ json={"config": "type: react\nname: test"},
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+ headers=_auth(key))
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+ assert r.status_code == 200, r.text[:300]
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+ body = r.json()
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+ assert "framework" in body or "errors" in body
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+
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+
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+def test_analyze_lint_rejects_oversize_yaml(client, tenant_and_key):
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+ """audit #26 + low #90: cap YAML body before yaml.safe_load to neuter
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+ billion-laughs alias amplification. Sending >256KB should 413."""
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+ _, key = tenant_and_key
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+ huge = "type: react\nname: " + ("x" * (260 * 1024))
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+ r = client.post("/api/v1/analyze/lint",
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+ json={"config": huge},
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+ headers=_auth(key))
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+ assert r.status_code == 413, (
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+ f"expected 413 CONFIG_TOO_LARGE, got {r.status_code}: {r.text[:200]}"
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+ )
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+
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+
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+# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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+# audit #14 — rollback_agent RBAC + tenant scope
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+# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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+
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+def test_rollback_cross_tenant_returns_404(client, db, tenant_and_key):
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+ """Tenant A asks to rollback tenant B's agent → 404 (id oracle defense).
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+ Even if A guessed B's agent_id correctly, response is identical to
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+ 'agent does not exist'."""
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+ _, key_a = tenant_and_key
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+ _, aid_b = _insert_tenant_with_agent(db, "tenant-b", "tenant-b-private")
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+
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+ r = client.post(f"/api/v1/agents/{aid_b}/rollback",
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+ json={"target_version": 1},
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+ headers=_auth(key_a))
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+ assert r.status_code == 404, (
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+ f"rollback across tenant boundary leaked! status={r.status_code}, "
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+ f"body={r.text[:300]}"
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+ )
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+
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+
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+def test_rollback_unknown_version_returns_404(client, db, tenant_and_key):
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+ """Tenant A asks to rollback their own agent to a version that
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+ doesn't exist → 404 VERSION_NOT_FOUND. Anchors the version-scoping
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+ query so we don't accidentally leak via a 5xx."""
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+ tid_a, key_a = tenant_and_key
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+ aid_a = gen_id("ag_")
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+ now = now_utc()
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+ db.execute(
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+ "INSERT INTO agents "
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+ "(id, tenant_id, name, description, status, created_at, updated_at) "
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+ "VALUES (?, ?, ?, '', 'active', ?, ?)",
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+ (aid_a, tid_a, "my-agent", now, now),
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+ )
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+ db.commit()
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+
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+ r = client.post(f"/api/v1/agents/{aid_a}/rollback",
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+ json={"target_version": 99},
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+ headers=_auth(key_a))
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+ assert r.status_code == 404
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+
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+
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+# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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+# audit #27 — knowledge/{kb_id}/files path containment
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+# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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+
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+def test_add_files_rejects_path_outside_kb_root(client, db, tenant_and_key, tmp_path):
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+ """audit #27 fix: `/etc/passwd`-style host paths must be rejected
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+ even if the caller owns the KB. Containment check uses resolved
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+ absolute path + os.sep prefix."""
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+ tid, key = tenant_and_key
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+
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+ # Set up a KB whose root_dir is inside tmp_path so we can also test
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+ # the positive case.
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+ kb_id = gen_id("kb_")
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+ kb_root = tmp_path / "kb"
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+ kb_root.mkdir()
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+ (kb_root / "ok.txt").write_text("inside kb_root")
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+ # Build a file OUTSIDE the kb_root to attempt to register.
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+ outside = tmp_path / "outside.txt"
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+ outside.write_text("attacker would love to chunk this")
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+
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+ now = now_utc()
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+ # knowledge_bases schema: id, tenant_id, name, root_dir, description,
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+ # created_at, updated_at (no `status` column)
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+ db.execute(
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+ "INSERT INTO knowledge_bases "
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+ "(id, tenant_id, name, root_dir, description, created_at, updated_at) "
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+ "VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, '', ?, ?)",
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+ (kb_id, tid, "test-kb", str(kb_root), now, now),
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+ )
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+ db.commit()
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+
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+ # Try to add the outside file — should be rejected.
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+ r = client.post(f"/api/v1/knowledge/{kb_id}/files",
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+ json={"file_paths": [str(outside)]},
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+ headers=_auth(key))
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+ # Endpoint returns 201 Created on successful POST regardless of how
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+ # many files were ultimately registered; the rejection shows up in
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+ # the body's `rejected` array.
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+ assert r.status_code in (200, 201), r.text[:300]
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+ body = r.json()
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+ assert body["added"] == 0, f"escaped file was registered! body={body}"
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+ assert "rejected" in body, "expected `rejected` array listing the refusal"
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+
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+ # Adding the inside file works (positive case).
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+ r2 = client.post(f"/api/v1/knowledge/{kb_id}/files",
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+ json={"file_paths": [str(kb_root / "ok.txt")]},
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+ headers=_auth(key))
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+ assert r2.status_code in (200, 201), r2.text[:300]
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+ assert r2.json()["added"] == 1
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+
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+
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+# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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+# audit #28 — /jobs/{job_id} IDOR
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+# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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+
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+def test_get_job_nonexistent_returns_404(client, tenant_and_key):
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+ """Sanity: unknown job_id → 404 (no 5xx, no leak)."""
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+ _, key = tenant_and_key
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+ r = client.get("/api/v1/jobs/job_doesnotexist", headers=_auth(key))
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+ assert r.status_code == 404
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+
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+
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+def test_cancel_job_nonexistent_returns_404(client, tenant_and_key):
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+ """Same for cancel — used to silently 200 even for nonexistent IDs."""
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+ _, key = tenant_and_key
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+ r = client.post("/api/v1/jobs/job_doesnotexist/cancel", headers=_auth(key))
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+ assert r.status_code == 404
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kenny67nju